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Abstract
Many questions addressing the emergence and dynamics of economic networks are
still unresolved, especially regarding dynamics on and of networks. Previous research
shows that processes at the micro-level affect socio-economic systems at aggregated lev-
els. These insights facilitated the development of models taking the network structure
explicitly into account. However, what is still missing is a systemic network theory
that considers the full complexity of socio-economic systems. We argue that sociological,
economic and institutional theories are complementary in many respects and have the po-
tential to fill this gap by providing the theoretical ground for an eclectic network theory.
In this paper, we address key concepts that are concerned with structuration processes
in socio-economic networks, review and reassess the literature in this field and discuss
approaches to explain pattern formation processes at higher aggregation levels. We pro-
pose to take advantage of the complementarities of the above outlined yet unconnected
research programs.
(149 words)
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1 Why study structuration processes and the dynamics of
networks?
Socio-economic systems are complex. A range of their characteristics depend on their struc-
tural configuration, the change of which is a multi-level phenomenon:
On the one hand, events at the micro level, i.e. vertex entries and exits as well as tie forma-
tion and termination, have structural consequence at higher aggregation levels of the system.
On the other hand, actors embedded in these systems are affected by systemic characteristics
and by their positioning in a system. Because economic systems are inherently dynamic,
both the systemic configurations and the actors’ relative positioning in these systems change
continuously. Network researchers have done an impressing job in explaining and formalizing
link formation and other dynamic mechanisms at the micro-level. Their models have been
successfully applied in epidemics, molecular biology, computer science, ecology, sociology,
among other fields. These advances also led to an increasing interest in the study of network-
related phenomena in economics including financial ownership networks, communication and
information networks, trading and supply chain networks, and innovation networks.
However, what is still missing is a systemic network theory that considers the full com-
plexity of socio-economic systems as a whole. We argue that sociological, economic and
institutional theories are complementary in many respects and have the potential to fill this
gap by providing the theoretical ground for an eclectic network theory in the future. This
paper provides a first step into this direction by reviewing the most influential theoretical and
empirical network dynamic and structuration models that have been proposed by now.
We focus on socio-economic networks where the vertices represent various types of so-
cial and economic actors, i.e. persons, firms, governmental entities etc. These actors are
typically interconnected in multiple ways. The further specification of the networks depend
on the type of network ties we look at: In innovation networks, our prime illustrative ex-
ample throughout this article, an edge between two firms represents a joint R&D activ-
ity between them. Therefore, innovation networks were usually conceptualized as follows
[Cantner and Graf, 2011, Brenner et al., 2011, Kudic, 2015]: (I) they consist of well-defined
sets of independent economic actors, (II) these actors are directly or indirectly interconnected
and the linkages allow for a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral exchange of ideas, information
knowledge and expertise, (III) the network is embedded in a broader socio-economic environ-
ment, and (IV) it has a strategic dimension in the sense that the actors involved cooperate to
recombine and generate new knowledge enclosed in goods or services to meet market demands
and customer needs. This definition applies foremostly to innovation networks but it can also
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be used as a natural starting point for other instances of networks in institutionalist theory
mentioned above.
Three particular aspects have been at the heart of the debate in interdisciplinary innova-
tion network research: firstly, the relatedness between network structure, network positioning
and performance outcomes. Secondly, dynamic processes on existing networks, e.g. games,
learning, knowledge exchange and diffusion processes. And thirdly, the evolution of the net-
work itself due to the formation and destruction of edges and vertices. While the first two
aspects have been studied extensively, many questions about the evolution of networks, and
the underlying determinants and mechanism causing structural network change at higher ag-
gregation levels, are still unresolved. The reasons range from conceptual and theoretical issues
to data bottlenecks to methodological limitations. This insight provides the vantage point of
this article, which aims at contributing to the existing body of literature in at least two ways:
On the one hand, we provide a comprehensive overview of the most important theoretical
ideas and methodological concepts addressing the structuration and dynamics of networks.
In doing so, we refer to the history of the study of network-related phenomena in economics
and sociology before reviewing the contemporary literature.
On the other hand, advances in various scientific disciplines provided us with highly so-
phisticated tools and methods for exploring and understanding networks from various angles.
We review the methodologically oriented network literature in four closely interrelated the-
matic fields: (i) clustering, (ii) scaling in large scale networks, (iii) small-word characteristics,
and (iv) core-periphery patterns. We discuss economic examples and outline in what way
the resulting insights can help further institutionalist theory and our understanding of socio-
economic systems.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses historical and
theoretical concepts in the interdisciplinary field of network research. Section 3 presents an
overview of findings on the structuration and dynamics of networks in economics. We conclude
in Section 4 with some remarks on limitations of contemporary network research and fruitful
avenues for future inquiry.
3
2 Theoretical Roots of Contemporary Network Research
in Economics and Related Disciplines
2.1 The Origins of Network Research
Structuration and the inherent dynamics of networks was already discussed in early writ-
ings in sociology, economics and other fields, even though the term ”network” is often not
explicitly used. This section reviews these early approaches in order to identify the origins of
contemporary network research and its constituting theoretical concepts and analytical tools.
2.1.1 A Glance over the Fence – Roots of Network Research in Other Disciplines
In the early 18th century mathematicians became interested in what later became known as
graph theoretical problems. In its most basic sense, graph theory is concerned with abstract
mathematical structures which can be fully described by limited number of lines (also called
ties or edges) between a well-defined set of objects (also called nodes or vertices). The first
graph theoretical problem – known as the seven bridges of Königsberg - was solved by Leonard
Euler in 1736. Since then, graph theory has developed greatly with many crucial problems
solved and important methods developed only in the 20th century.
Game theory, also emerging in the 20th century, is another mathematical pillar of modern
network theory. It is concerned with strategic interactions of rational players and develops
models that allow predicting – under very restrictive idealized conditions – the behavior of
the sequentially interacting players in the game. The development of game theory entailed
the possibility of models of games on networks.1 Another closely related strand of game-
theoretical literature focuses on the formation of network [Jackson, 2003, Goyal, 2007]. The
concepts and models from these two fields turned out to provide a rich theoretical basis for
numerical agent-based simulation modeling which is another powerful tool to study networks,
particularly dynamics of formation and development of networks of higher complexity.
2.1.2 Networks in Economic Theory
From today’s point of view, it may seem obvious that economic systems are always built on a
social layer of many interacting entities (agents, firms, and others) and that the microstructure
of these systems matters in various ways for their nature as a whole. But this has not always
been the case: much of traditional economic theory derives from concepts such as mechanical
equilibria in a price-utility system which effectively eliminate any importance of the micro-level
1An excellent overview and synthesis of such models is given in Jackson and Zenou
[Jackson and Zenou, 2015].
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structure or the representative agent which justifies the treatment of micro- and macro-layer
as identical and homogeneous.
Network theory entered economics – well after the fixation of the Walrasian-Marshallian
microeconomic standard – via the study of nonlinear interactions of aggregate concepts such
as industries in supply relationships. These interdisciplinary approaches, e.g. [Goodwin, 1947,
Simon, 1953] were soon joined by other traditions of literature that investigated the role of
social networks in economics and of different network structures at the micro-layer of economic
interactions between firms and agents of all kind (e.g. [Bowles and Gintis, 1975] following
advances in sociology, see section 2.1.3). This enabled agent-based models which, based
on earlier Schumpeterian and institutionalist groundwork, were very successful in describing
industry dynamics realistically (see, e.g. [Nelson and Winter, 1982, Arthur, 1989]).
However, the fact that earlier theories did not take network theory into account does not
mean that the respective models are not subject to properties resulting from their implicitly
assumed underlying network. General equilibrium theory, for example, presumes in effect
either star networks (with a hypothetical auctionator in the center position) or complete
graphs - which result from the assumption of perfect homogenity in a hypothetical global
market without transaction costs or any institutional obstacles. Naturally, not all economists
were content with this theory. Institutionalists criticized the lack of representation of human
social reality. Veblen [Veblen, 1898] ridiculed the concept of human nature employed in (in this
case Carl Menger’s) equilibrium theory as ”hedonistic man”; Polanyi [Polanyi, 1944] argued
that the economy was not only embedded in social relations but that the project of equilibrium
theory was to disentangle this - something he argued to be absurd and impossible. Of course,
the tools to apply this to formal models were not available at the time both in terms of
theoretical concepts and in terms of computation power.
2.1.3 Sociological contributions to network research
The common ground of social network theorizing is the notion that individuals are embed-
ded in social structures. The explanation of causes and consequences of various types of
interrelations among individuals is one of the key topics in social science.
Simmel [Simmel, 1922] already emphasized the fact that the nature of ties among indi-
viduals affects their behaviors in multiple ways. In the mid of the 20th century, sociologists
started to employ graph theoretical concepts to operationalize social structures. One of the
pioneers in this research area was Barnes [Barnes, 1954] who helped coin the term “social
network”. The concept attracted a great deal of attention and constituted the starting point
for new research in the field. Several important advances in the theory of social networks
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date back to this period. For instance, Milgram’s [Milgram, 1967] letter-passing experiment
showed that people in the United States are separated by, on avarage, only six degrees of
separation. That is, the average shortest path between any two individuals2 is no longer than
six interaction steps. The findings and implications triggered countless research efforts on
”small-world characteristics” in subsequent years (for an overview, see: [Uzzi et al., 2007], see
also section 3).
The social capital and embeddedness literature [Laumann et al., 1978] emphasizes that
economic actions and outcomes are influenced by the context in which they occur. A con-
troversial discussion in social capital literature arose on whether and to what extent weak
ties [Granovetter, 1973, Levin and Cross, 2004] or strong ties [Uzzi, 1996, Krackhardt, 1992]
affect the actors’ behavior and outcomes in social and economic networks.3 Other semi-
nal contributions [Bourdieu, 1986] paved the way for what we refer to as “closure” theory
[Coleman, 1988]. The concept is based on the notion that a network actor’s positioning in
a “cohesive” network structure, densely interconnected and interdependent agents at least at
the local level, goes along with several advantages. Cohesion is typically assumed to facilitate
“the build-up of reputation, trust, social norms, and social control, for example by coalition
building to constrain actions, which facilitates collaboration” [Nooteboom, 2008, p.619].
By contrast, the structural hole theory [Burt, 1992] put forward an efficiency argument
and assumes that a network position to be beneficial when it allows the actor to bridge
the gap between two unconnected (or at least less connected) subgroups of the network.
Integrative approaches between these two theoretical concepts emerged recently [Burt, 2005,
Rowley et al., 2000].
2.2 What are inter-firm networks and why do they exist?
In the late 20th century a controversial debate among sociologists and economists arose on
the very nature of hybrid organizational forms. Why do individual economic entities develop
decentralized cooperative practices and do not limit their innovative activities to the hierar-
chies within the firm or exchange their results on the market (if there were such a thing as
an ideal free market)?
The common ground of traditional economic explanations of hybrid organizational forms is
the use of transaction cost arguments. In this context, economists [Ouchi, 1980, Jarillo, 1988,
Williamson, 1991] have argued that hybrids are an organizational form positioned interme-
2The implicit network model in this context is that vertices stand for individuals and edges indicate direct
acquaintance or interaction.
3Granovetter’s [Granovetter, 1973] concept of weak and strong ties was designed to capture the overlap
between connected agent’s direct neighborhood with the strength of the link higher the larger the overlap
while weak ties tend to be links to more distant parts of the network.
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diately between markets and hierarchies. According to Williamson [Williamson, 1991], the
key distinguishing feature of hybrids compared to other forms of governance is a flexible
contracting mechanism that facilitates continuity and efficient adaptation [Nee, 1992, p.2].
He conducted a discrete structural analysis in order to compare the three supposed generic
forms of economic organization – markets, hybrids and hierarchies – in terms of governance
cost efficiency with regard to the level of uncertainty, frequency of disturbance, and asset
specificity. One of the key findings from this comparative-static analysis is that transactions
characterized by an intermediate level of asset specificity are most efficiently processed by
hybrid organizational forms, i.e. innovation networks [Williamson, 1991, p.284].
Many institutionalists, however, reject the argument since boundedly rational agents act-
ing under true uncertainty are neither able nor willing to perform these transaction cost
calculations [Hodgson, 1993]. An evolutionary argument could be applied (i.e., that they
do not optimize their organizational type but evolutionary selection works in its favor and
eliminates other types), but this argument fails to recognize that there is a huge number of
environmental and institutional factors beyond transaction costs that would interfere with
such a selection mechanism.
Sociologists proposed an alternative explanation for the existence of hybrid organiza-
tional forms. They argued that hybrids have to be seen as unique organizational struc-
tures and thus should be considered an organizational form in their own right [Powell, 1987,
Podolny and Page, 1998]. According to this line of argument, the transaction cost perspec-
tive fails to see and explain the enormous variety of forms that cooperative arrangements
can take. Powell [Powell, 1987, p.77-82] draws up four factors that explain the emergence,
existence and proliferation of hybrid organizational forms: (I) hybrid organizational forms
allow greater flexibility and adaptability to rapidly changing environments (II) hybrids allow
large organizations, which are usually considered to be structurally inert and thus resistant
to change, to overcome, at least to some extent, these limitations; (III) hybrids provide fast
and flexible access to information and knowledge located outside the firm’s boundaries; (IV)
hybrids have to be understood as a variant or application of the “generalized reciprocity con-
cept” (i.e. individual units do not exist in isolation but rather in relation to other units, cf.
Podolny and Page [Podolny and Page, 1998]) that creates legitimacy, reputation and mutual
trust, and thus generates an efficient and reliable environment for exchange and transfer of
information.
The preceding discussion provides very different perspectives on the same phenomenon
- i.e. the explanation of the very nature of hybrid organizational forms such as economic
networks. The transaction cost logic certainly captures not the multiplicity and complexity
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of economic network observable in real life. In other words the explanation of the existence
of economic networks cannot be reduced to a transaction cost optimization problem. This is
in line with institutional and evolutionary arguments on the role of uncertainty and bounded
rationality in market processes. The sociological view on networks also represents a contra-
diction to the transaction cost perspective. The explanation of the very nature of networks
is based on a more comprehensive understanding. It incorporates several important aspects
which are inherently entailed in institutional and evolutionary lines of argument.
3 Structuration Processes and Network Dynamics
Traditional modeling in economics generally relied on random graphs and most often on
complete networks until fairly recently. Before the great advances of network theory in the
1990s, networks were usually not considered an important feature of a model in economics.
This section shows why that well-established practice in mainstream economics is far too
limited.
Section 3.1 offers an overview about the most fundamental stylized facts of real world
networks. The particular models and methods that are used to identify and explain these
regularities are summarized in an online appendix to this article. Section 3.2 discusses dy-
namics on and of networks in more detail.
3.1 Some Stylized Facts of Economic Networks
We focus on empirical results regarding the degree of clustering in economic networks, their
diameter and their degree distribution mainly for two reasons: Firstly, these characteristics
received the most attention in explorative studies and empirical results on their regularities
are abundant. Secondly they represent the most distinctive properties of economic networks
for which empirical results are available.
3.1.1 Clustering
A cluster is a subset of vertices are characterized by an above average degree of intercon-
nectedness. The precise interpretation of clustering depends on the definition of the edges:
usually, an edge exists between two vertices if the corresponding firms hold up close research
collaboration (no matter how close they are geographically). Clusters are therefore interpreted
in a functional way. Functional clusters are a common phenomenon, e.g. if one considers co-
operation networks among firms [Storper and Harrison, 1991]. Here, clusters are of particular
theoretical interest as they tend to ”outgrow” the market: close relations among the different
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players may be initiated for economic reasons, but after some time reciprocal relationships
yield a higher level of trust. This may be one reason for the stability of industrial clusters.
But there are many other instances where clusters were identified in economic networks,
e.g. countries in the world trade networks form clusters of dense trade relationships with each
other [Fagiolo et al., 2010], or banks in financial markets form clusters of mutual lending and
borrowing [Fricke and Lux, 2014].
In all these cases, the identification of clusters represented a vantage point for more concise
models of the phenomenon under study in which the emergence of the cluster, and its economic
importance could be considered.
3.1.2 Small-World Property
A straightforward way to account for clustering is the usage of regular grid networks that
have been widely employed in economic modeling (see, e.g., Schelling [Schelling, 1971]). This,
however, does not sufficiently represent the structure of most social and economic networks.
It has been shown that real world networks are clustered and characterized by short average
path lengths.
Networks that combine these two properties, strong clustering and small diameter, are
referred to as small world networks.4 It has been an important empirical contribution to
show that small-world networks are common in the economy and to motivate the theoretical
question of how these networks emerged and what their consequences are. Are there common
mechanisms causing the network to be so similar in so different areas? Studies providing
potential answers to this questions are summarized in the online appendix to this article.
Empirical exercises addressing the structure of knowledge transfer networks among
firms [Cowan and Jonard, 2004], firm ownership [Kogut and Walker, 2001], relations among
the boards of directors of the biggest US firms [Davis et al., 2003], the collaboration
among research institutes [Cowan and Jonard, 2004], and firm’s research collaborations
[Phelps and Schilling, 2005].
3.1.3 Heavy Tails and Scaling
Another important statistical property of social and economic networks is their typical degree
distribution. The degree of a vertex is the number of links it has to other vertices in the
network. A degree of four means the vertex is connected to four other vertices. Information
on how degrees are distributed among the different vertices may hint at important underlying
mechanisms operating in the system under study.
4The name stems from Milgram’s [Milgram, 1967] famous study according to which every person on the
planet knows any other person with on average only six intermediate steps.
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As in the case of clustering and diameter, the distribution of degrees in real world networks
shows a surprising regularity: the degree distribution is highly asymmetric with the number
of neighbors (the degree) being inversely proportional to the relative frequency of vertices
with this number of neighbors. The resulting distribution is called scale-free, so called as
the shape of the distribution remains unchanged no matter which part of the distribution is
considered or whether the network is scaled to some level of aggregation.
Research into network structures of inter-firm networks and other networks in eco-
nomic systems found that these networks also were scale-free (e.g., [Kim et al., 2002,
Souma et al., 2003, Foster, 2005]). The high probability of tail events in such distributions
is particularly relevant since averaging over large numbers of observations may not work
since the central limit theorem may not be applicable. Risk management relying on such
averaging operations would consequently fail. This is particularly problematic in corporate
ownership and corporate lending networks which have indeed been found to be heavy tailed
[Iori et al., 2008, Battiston et al., 2007].5
It should be noted that some doubt has been cast in recent years on whether all distri-
butions claimed to be scale-free actually belong into that category. It is difficult to statisti-
cally differentiate between scale-free (power law) distributions and other candidates includ-
ing log-normal, exponential with cutoff and less regular distributions [Clauset et al., 2009,
Heinrich, 2014]. The property of heavy tails, however, remains unaffected and some or all of
the implications may also be preserved for these alternative distributions. Schweizer et al.
[Schweitzer et al., 2009] give an overview over more recent empirical findings and the more
recent discussion of heavy tails in economic networks.
3.1.4 Core-Periphery Structure
One huge advantage of using the formal apparatus of network theory is to be very precise
about the concrete network structure of the system under study. This precise language helps
to identify regularities that would not be apparent if the network had not been represented
as a graph. The core-periphery structure represents a relevant example:
In its most basic sense, the core-periphery concept is based on the notion of “(...) a dense,
cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected periphery” [Borgatti and Everett, 2000a].
This means that in a core periphery network basically two types of vertices exist: one
group of vertices that are very closely connected (the “core”), and another group of vertices
(the “periphery") that are sparely connected and typically spread across several small and
unconnected components.
5The identification of scaling laws is not limited to economic networks but was motivated by findings in
several other fields (stock price returns, firm sizes, city sizes, etc., see e.g. Newman, [Newman, 2003]).
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Hence, the core of the network occupies a dominant position in contrast to the subor-
dinated network periphery and the identification of core-periphery structures in real world
networks may help identifying important differences in power among different actors in a
network. Rank and her colleagues [Rank et al., 2006], for instance, have argued that actors
in the core of a network have a favorable position for negotiating with peripheral actors in
bargaining networks.
Concrete empirical strategies to identify core-periphery patterns were proposed by
[Borgatti and Everett, 2000b] and [Holme, 2005] (the latter based on the well known k-core
concept of [Doreian and Woodard, 1994]. And indeed, building on the seminal contributions
of Craig and von Peter [Craig and Von Peter, 2010], economists found, for example, that
the lending behavior of banks can be much more adequately described by core periphery
networks than by scale-free networks [Fricke and Lux, 2014].
This empirical finding does not only have descriptive value, it also helps identifying the
generative mechanisms that bring about such networks of lending and to study potential
outcomes of policy measures in this context. In banking networks, core and periphery elements
play different roles in the financial system that should be taken into account for a reasonable
regulation to be implemented.
But core-periphery networks can also be found very different contexts, such as the German
laser industry sector[Kudic et al., 2015], and supply chains in general [Bair, 2008] and inter-
national trade networks [Fagiolo et al., 2010]. In international trade, some countries form a
center of the trade network and other countries are connected only to a few of these cen-
tral vertices, thus being strongly dependent on them. The identified pattern is very stable
over time, including time spans of increasing globalization [Fagiolo et al., 2010]. It should be
considered e.g. in the discussion about the socio-economic consequences of globalization, a
prominent topic in the evolutionary-institutional community: the marginalization of certain
countries in such a trade network both polarizes wealth and capabilities of different countries
and does not contribute to overall efficiency [Fagiolo et al., 2010].
3.2 Dynamics on Networks
The topology of networks is fundamentally important in economic contexts because the struc-
ture of a firm’s (or an agent’s) environment determines to a large part the risks it has to
confront as well as its strategic options and its potential to use them. It is therefore crucial
to understand why there are so many stable regularities of the social networks we considered
so far.
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To answer this question one should pay particular attention on what happens on the
networks: the development of such networks tends to depend on both the decisions of the
firm or agent representing the vertices and their success in surviving immediate threats both
alone and in conjunction with their local environment. Less successful parts of the network
will be more volatile or may fail completely and can (in cases in which persistent regularities
emerge) lead to an evolution-like self-organization of the network as a whole. It is obvious that
structure and function of properties of the network are interlocked in this case and will co-
evolve. This structure-function relationship is one of the research frontiers of modern network
science.
One of the most natural approaches to model strategic interaction on networks is to study
games played on graphs. For simple networks, analytical results on how the structure of
networks affects the outcome of games played are available (e.g. [Kets et al., 2011]) but the
effect of complex, empirical networks must usually be studied via simulations. Pacheco et al.
[Pacheco et al., 2009] for example study how network structure affects the performance of dif-
ferent strategies in the Prisoners Dilemma. This aligns well with the institutionalist literature
on the topic of economic trust and recognized interdependence, and many complementarities
are to be exploited.
Various studies analyzed the emergence of an commodity-exchange equilibrium on net-
works [Albin and Foley, 1992, Gintis, 2007, Axtell, 2005] and the emergence of social classes
[Axtell et al., 2001] in bargaining games on networks among other things.
Further, it was found that models from epidemics are well-suited to model information
diffusion and technology adoption (adapted from models of the diffusion of epidemics). A
distinguishing factor for such models is that diffusion speed depends crucially on the current
prevalence of the property in question and the size of the reachable population as well as the
properties of the network. Further, the case of technology diffusion likely involves network
effects which are quite different from global network effects [Arthur, 1989] which are monopo-
lizing. Local network effects in small-world networks and scale-free networks may, depending
on the parameters of the network, allow for either monopolization or for the persistence of
niches of minority technologies [Uchida and Shirayama, 2008, Pegoretti et al., 2009].
4 Open question and fruitful avenues for further research
Network theory made it possible to apply a realistic representation of the micro-layer of
economic interaction to formal models. This is something that indirectly follows from the ve-
hement institutionalist criticism of static equilibrium models [Veblen, 1898, Polanyi, 1944] and
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that was with the progessive development of network theory gradually applied to economics
(see [Schelling, 1971, Bowles and Gintis, 1975, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Kauffman, 1993]
and many more).
Only more recent advances from the field of complex networks allowed the systematic
investigation of the various kinds of networks in found in economics systems. It is now
understood that social networks found in reality exhibit surprising statistical regularities: the
small-world property, clustering, scale-free degree distributions or the core-periphery structure
are very common structures found in very different contexts.
However, there are still gaping holes in our understanding of networks and many promising
paths of research are not yet exhaustively explored. The reasons are twofold. First, for
many characteristics of real world networks we are still not able to mathematically describe
their generating mechanisms, or their properties. Particularly at a more fine grained level of
description, and particularly for more complex networks, only descriptive, but nomechanismic
models are available yet.
The term mechanismic comes from [Bunge, 2011] who uses it to distinguish mechanismic
from instrumental or hermeneutic explanations. A mechansmic explanation proposes a par-
ticular mechanism that has led to the creation of the network. It provides a much deeper
insight into the system under investigation than the alternative modes of explanation because
it not only illustrates what is the state of the system under investigation, but also why the
system is in this particular state.6 Developing more mechanismic models for social networks
is a key area for further research.
Second, the available data is limited. There is some data on corporate ownership net-
works, trade, and supply networks. Many of these are, however, from particular contexts or
particular isolated sources which does not allow continuous and comprehensive observation
of the network’s development. Innovation networks can be inferred from patent and funding
co-applications. But this is an indirect observation; it does not allow to make any observa-
tions on the number and network theoretic characteristics of unsuccessful R&D cooperations
nor does it yield conclusive evidence on the lengths of cooperations and the possible role of
the network in this. In fact, models often assume a homogenous cooperation duration of 3
years, a potentially unrealistic assumption. Tie termination processes are as important as
tie formations. Hence, we need to spend much more time and resourcen developing models
and gathering comprehensive data on tie termination processes [Schilling and Phelps, 2007].
Data on social and professional networks is scarce for reasons of privacy and the difficulty
6See [Gräbner and Kapeller, 2015] for a more detailed epistemological and ontological discussion of the
concepts of social mechanisms and mechanismic explanations and their usefulness for economic research.
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to gather such data. Thus, a potentially large number of networks relevant for economics
remains completely unstudied.
Despite these open issues, we argue that the progress of network theory and its applica-
tion to economics is good news for social and institutionalist economics. Scholars in these
traditions have maintained the importance of studying direct interactions between humans in
a realistic, non-aggregated, non-idealized way [Elsner, 2014]. The infeasibility of representing
this in formal models has complicated progress in these areas. This, however, is changing:
with network theory and agent-based simulations, the study of social interactions, institu-
tions, and many other issues, can also be extended to and beyond what has already been
accomplished for network models in innovation economics, financial economics (where struc-
tural instability is thoroughly investigated since the recent economic crisis), and information
economics [Gräbner, 2015].
We therefore close this article by emphasizing that the two camps of network scientists
and socio-economists have much to offer to each other: network theorists developed a huge
set of tools to model networks and to identify their empirical regularities. Socio-economists
produced a tremendous amount of knowledge about socio-economic mechanisms that may help
to develop the mechanismic explanations of the structure of the socio-economic systems we
see. Only with the knowledge about these mechanisms we will be able to proceed significantly
in our understanding of the complex socio-economic systems we are interested in.
References
[Albin and Foley, 1992] Albin, P. S. and Foley, D. K. (1992). Decentralized, dispersed ex-
change without an auctioneer : A simulation study. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 18(1):27 – 51.
[Arthur, 1989] Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in
by historical events. Economic Journal, 99(394):116–31.
[Axtell, 2005] Axtell, R. (2005). The complexity of exchange. The Economic Journal,
115(504):F193–F210.
[Axtell et al., 2001] Axtell, R., Epstein, J. M., and Young, H. (2001). The emergence of
classes in a multi-agent bargaining model. In Young, H. and Durlauf, S., editors, Social
Dynamics, pages 191–211. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Bair, 2008] Bair, J. (2008). Analysing global economic organization: embedded networks
and global chains compared. Economy and Society, 37(3):339–364.
14
[Barnes, 1954] Barnes, J. A. (1954). Class and committees in a norwegian island parish.
Human Relations, 7(1):39–58.
[Battiston et al., 2007] Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., and Stiglitz,
J. E. (2007). Credit chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(6):2061 – 2084.
[Borgatti and Everett, 2000a] Borgatti, S. P. and Everett, M. G. (2000a). Models of
core/periphery structures. Social Networks, 21(4):375 – 395.
[Borgatti and Everett, 2000b] Borgatti, S. P. and Everett, M. G. (2000b). Models of
core/periphery structures. Social Networks, 21(4):375 – 395.
[Bourdieu, 1986] Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In Biggart, N. W., editor, Read-
ings in Economic Sociology, pages 280–291. Blackwell Publishers Ltd:, Malen, Mass.
[Bowles and Gintis, 1975] Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1975). The problem with human capital
theory–a marxian critique. The American Economic Review, 65(2):74–82.
[Brenner et al., 2011] Brenner, T., Cantner, U., and Graf, H. (2011). Innovation networks:
Measurement, performance and regional dimensions. Industry and Innovation.
[Bunge, 2011] Mario Bunge (1997). Mechanism and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, 27(4):410-465.
[Burt, 1992] Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Harvard
university press, Cambridge.
[Burt, 2005] Burt, R. S. (2005). Brokerage and closure: An introduction to social capital.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
[Cantner and Graf, 2011] Cantner, U. and Graf, H. (2011). Innovation networks: formation,
performance and dynamics. In Antonelli, C., editor, Handbook on the economic complexity
of technological change, pages 366–394. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
[Clauset et al., 2009] Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., and Newman, M. E. J. (2009). Power-law
distributions in empirical data. SIAM Review, 51(4):661–703.
[Coleman, 1988] Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital.
American Journal of Sociology, 94:S95–S120.
[Cowan and Jonard, 2004] Cowan, R. and Jonard, N. (2004). Network structure and the
diffusion of knowledge. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(8):1557 – 1575.
15
[Craig and Von Peter, 2010] Craig, B. and Von Peter, G. (2010). Interbank tier-
ing and money center banks. BIS Working Papers No 322, Available online:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1687281.
[Davis et al., 2003] Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., and Baker, W. E. (2003). The small world of the
american corporate elite, 1982-2001. Strategic Organization, 1(3):301–326.
[Doreian and Woodard, 1994] Doreian, P. and Woodard, K. L. (1994). Defining and locating
cores and boundaries of social networks. Social Networks, 16(4):267 – 293.
[Elsner, 2014] Elsner, W. (2014). Social economics and evolutionary institutionalism today.
theoretical components and heterodox convergence in a socio-economic perspective. Forum
for Social Economics.
[Fagiolo et al., 2010] Fagiolo, G., Reyes, J., and Schiavo, S. (2010). The evolution of the world
trade web: a weighted-network analysis. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 20(4):479–
514.
[Foster, 2005] Foster, J. (2005). From simplistic to complex systems in economics. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 29(6):873–892.
[Fricke and Lux, 2014] Fricke, D. and Lux, T. (2014). Core-periphery structure in the
overnight money market: Evidence from the e-mid trading platform. Computational Eco-
nomics, 45:359–395.
[Gintis, 2007] Gintis, H. (2007). The dynamics of general equilibrium. The Economic Journal,
117(523):1280–1309.
[Goodwin, 1947] Goodwin, R. M. (1947). Dynamical coupling with especial reference to
markets having production lags. Econometrica, 15(3):181–204.
[Goyal, 2007] Goyal, S. (2007). Connections: An introduction to the economics of networks.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[Gräbner, 2015] Gräbner, C. and Kapeller, J. (2015). The micro-macro link in heterodox
economics. ICAE Working Paper Series, No. 37, 07/2015.
[Gräbner and Kapeller, 2015] Gräbner, C. (2015). Formal approaches to socio-economic
analysis-past and perspectives. Forum for Social Economics. forthcoming.
[Granovetter, 1973] Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal
of Sociology, 78(6):1360–1380.
16
[Heinrich, 2014] Heinrich, T. (2014). Commodity and resource etf trading patterns during
the financial crisis. Complexity, forthcoming.
[Hodgson, 1993] Hodgson, G. M. (1993). Transaction costs and the evolution of the firm. In
Pitelis, C. N., editor, Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies, pages 77–100. Wiley-
Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, MA.
[Holme, 2005] Holme, P. (2005). Core-periphery organization of complex networks. Phys.
Rev. E, 72:046111.
[Iori et al., 2008] Iori, G., Masi, G. D., Precup, O. V., Gabbi, G., and Caldarelli, G. (2008).
A network analysis of the italian overnight money market. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 32(1):259 – 278. Applications of statistical physics in economics and finance.
[Jackson, 2003] Jackson, M. O. (2003). The stability and efficiency of economic and social
networks. In Dutta, B. and Jackson, M. O., editors, Networks and Groups. Models of
Strategic Formation, pages 99–140. Springer, Heidelberg.
[Jackson and Zenou, 2015] Jackson, M. O. and Zenou, Y. (2015). Games on networks. In
Young, H. P. and Zamir, S., editors, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
pages 95 – 163. Elsevier.
[Jarillo, 1988] Jarillo, J. C. (1988). On strategic networks. Strategic Management Journal,
9(1):31–41.
[Kauffman, 1993] Kauffman, S. (1993). The Origins of Order: self-organization and selection
in evolution. Oxford University Press.
[Kets et al., 2011] Kets, W., Iyengar, G., Sethi, R., and Bowles, S. (2011). Inequality and
network structure. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1):215 – 226.
[Kim et al., 2002] Kim, H.-J., Kim, I.-M., Lee, Y., and Kahng, B. (2002). Scale-free network
in stock markets. Journal of the Korean Physical Society, 40(6):1105–1108.
[Kogut and Walker, 2001] Kogut, B. and Walker, G. (2001). The small world of germany and
the durability of national networks. American Sociological Review, 66(3):317–335.
[Krackhardt, 1992] Krackhardt, D. (1992). The strength of strong ties: The importance of
philos in organizations. In Nohria, N. and Eccles, R. G., editors, Networks and organiza-
tions: Structure, form, and action, pages 216–239. Harvard Buisness Press, Boston, MA.
17
[Kudic, 2015] Kudic, M. (2015). Innovation networks in the German laser industry - evolu-
tionary change, strategic positioning and firm innovativeness. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
New York.
[Kudic et al., 2015] Kudic, M., Ehrenfeld, W., and Pusch, T. (2015). On the trail of core-
periphery patterns in innovation networks: measurements and new empirical findings from
the german laser industry. The Annals of Regional Science (ARSC).
[Laumann et al., 1978] Laumann, E. O., Galaskiewicz, J., and Marsden, P. V. (1978). Com-
munity structure as interorganizational linkages. Annual Review of Sociology, 4:455–484.
[Levin and Cross, 2004] Levin, D. Z. and Cross, R. (2004). The strength of weak ties you can
trust: The mediating role of trust in effective knowledge transfer. Management Science,
50(11):1477–1490.
[Milgram, 1967] Milgram, S. (1967). The small world problem. Psychology today, 2(1):60–67.
[Nee, 1992] Nee, V. (1992). Organizational dynamics of market transition: Hybrid forms,
property rights, and mixed economy in china. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1):1–
27.
[Nelson and Winter, 1982] Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory
of Economic Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
[Newman, 2003] Newman, M. E. J. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks.
SIAM Review, 45(2):167–256.
[Nooteboom, 2008] Nooteboom, B. (2008). Learning and innovation in inter-organizational
relationships. In Cropper, S., Ebers, M., Huxham, C., and Ring, P. S., editors, The Oxford
handbook of inter-organizational relations, pages 607–634. Oxford University Press, New
York.
[Ouchi, 1980] Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 25(1):129–141.
[Pacheco et al., 2009] Pacheco, J. M., Pinheiro, F. L., and Santos, F. C. (2009). Popula-
tion structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation. PLoS
Comput Biol, 5(12):e1000596.
[Pegoretti et al., 2009] Pegoretti, G., Rentocchini, F., and Vittucci Marzetti, G. (2009). An
agent-based model of competitive diffusion: network structure and coexistence. OPENLOC
working paper series, No. 16/2009, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italy.
18
[Phelps and Schilling, 2005] Phelps, C. and Schilling, M. A. (2005). Interfirm collaboration
networks: The impact of small world connectivity on firm innovation. Academy of Man-
agement Proceedings, 2005(1):O1–O6.
[Podolny and Page, 1998] Podolny, J. M. and Page, K. L. (1998). Network forms of organi-
zation. Annual Review of Sociology, 24:57–76.
[Polanyi, 1944] Polanyi, K. (2001 [1944]). The creat transformation.
[Powell, 1987] Powell, W. W. (1987). Hybrid organizational arrangements: New form or
transitional development?. California Management Review, 30(1):67 – 87.
[Rank et al., 2006] Rank, C., Rank, O., andWald, A. (2006). Integrated versus core-periphery
structures in regional biotechnology networks. European Management Journal, 24(1):73 –
85.
[Rowley et al., 2000] Rowley, T., Behrens, D., and Krackhardt, D. (2000). Redundant gov-
ernance structures: an analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and
semiconductor industries. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3):369–386.
[Schelling, 1971] Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathe-
matical Sociology, 1:143–186.
[Schilling and Phelps, 2007] Schilling, M. A. and Phelps, C. C. (2007). Interfirm collaboration
networks: The impact of large-scale network structure on firm innovation. Management
Science, 53(7):1113–1126.
[Schweitzer et al., 2009] Schweitzer, F., Fagiolo, G., Sornette, D., Vega-Redondo, F., Vespig-
nani, A., and White, D. R. (2009). Economic networks: the new challenges. Science,
325(5939):422–425.
[Simmel, 1922] Simmel, G. (1955 [1922]). Conflict and the web of group affiliations. Free
Press, New York. Translated by K. Wolff and R. Bendix.
[Simon, 1953] Simon, H. A. (1953). Notes on the observation and measurement of political
power. The Journal of Politics, 15(4):500–516.
[Souma et al., 2003] Souma, W., Fujiwara, Y., and Aoyama, H. (2003). Complex networks
and economics. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 324(1-2):396 – 401.
Proceedings of the International Econophysics Conference.
19
[Storper and Harrison, 1991] Storper, M. and Harrison, B. (1991). Flexibility, hierarchy and
regional development: The changing structure of industrial production systems and their
forms of governance in the 1990s. Research Policy, 20(5):407–422.
[Uchida and Shirayama, 2008] Uchida, M. and Shirayama, S. (2008). Influence of a network
structure on the network effect in the communication service market. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 387(21):5303 – 5310.
[Uzzi, 1996] Uzzi, B. (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic
performance of organizations: The network effect. American Sociological Review, 61(4):674–
698.
[Uzzi et al., 2007] Uzzi, B., Amaral, L. A., and Reed-Tsochas, F. (2007). Small-world net-
works and management science research: a review. European Management Review, 4(2):77–
91.
[Veblen, 1898] Veblen, T. B. (1898). Why is economics not an evolutionary science? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12(4):373–397.
[Williamson, 1991] Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The anal-
ysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2):pp. 269–296.
20
Approaches to the Modelling of Economic Networks – Online Appendix for Gräbner, Heinrich, and Kudic: Structuration processes in complex 
dynamic systems  
 
Clustering 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of 
segregation. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, 1:143–186. 
 
- Segregation as result from the interplay and 
dynamics of interactive individual choices 
- Distribution of members in neighborhoods 
defined by reference to their own location 
- Second model deals with compartmented 
space  
- Deals also with ‘neighborhood tipping’ 
- One simulation model and 
one analytic model 
- No simple correspondence of individual 
incentive to collective results 
- Exaggerated separation and patterning result 
from the dynamics of movement 
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Watts, D. J. and Strogatz, S. H. (1998). 
Collective dynamics of ’small-world’ 
networks. Nature, 393(6684):440-442 
- Characteristics and dynamics of 
small world networks and connection 
topology 
- Neural network of the worm 
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world problem. American Journal of 
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- Dynamics of small world networks 
- Impact of small world properties on 
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- Varying “small world” properties of the systemic‐
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and artistic performance 
Fleming, L., Charles King, I., and Juda, A. I. 
(2007). Small worlds and regional innovation. 
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- Small-world networks in regional 
context 
- Investigation of the effects of 
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- Development and exploitation of a 
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models 
- Existence of regional small-world structures 
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regions 
- Shorter path lengths and larger connected 
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Schilling, M. A. and Phelps, C. C.  2007). 
Interfirm collaboration networks: The impact 
of large-scale network structure on firm 
innovation. Management Science, 
53(7):1113–1126. 
- Influence of alliance networks 
structure on potential knowledge 
creation / innovation 
- Longitudinal study of the patent 
performance of 1,106 firms in 11 
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- Interfirm collaboration networks with short path 
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Heavy Tails and Scaling 
Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Price, D. D. S. (1976). A general theory 
of bibliometric and other cumulative 
advantage processes. Journal of the 
American Society for Information 
Science, 27(5):292-306. 
- Cumulative Advantage Distribution is 
proposed which models the situation in 
which success breeds success 
- Modelling Distributions  - Stochastic law is governed by the Beta Function 
containing only one free parameter which 
approximated diverse social science phenomena 
Barabási, A.-L. and Albert, R. (1999). 
Emergence of scaling in random 
networks. Science, 286(5439):509- 512. 
- Emergence of networks  
- Property of large, complex networks: 
vertex connectivities following a scale-
free power-law distribution 
- Modelling scale-free distributions - Networks expand continuously by the addition of 
new vertices 
- New vertices attach preferentially to sites that are 
already well connected 
- Development of large networks is governed by 
robust self-organizing phenomena 
Podolny, J. M. (1994). Market uncertainty 
and the social character of economic 
exchange. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 39(3):458-483. 
- Organizations overcome the problems of 
market uncertainty in selecting exchange 
partners 
- Study of investment banking 
relationships in the investment 
grade and non-investment-grade 
debt markets from 1981 to 1987 
- The greater the market uncertainty the more 
organizations engage in exchanges relations they 
already have transacted in the past 
- The greater uncertainty, the more that organizations 
engage in transactions with those of similar status 
Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., and Hybels, R. 
C. (1999). Interorganizational 
endorsements and the performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44(2):315-349. 
- Examination of the ecological 
consequences of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and acquisitions 
- Focus on how the spatial distribution 
influence the location-specific founding 
rates of new companies 
- Count models of biotechnology 
firm 
- IPOs of organizations located contiguous to or 
within an MSA (metropolitan statistical area) 
accelerate the founding rate within that MSA  
- Acquisitions of biotech firms situated near to or 
within an MSA accelerate the founding rate within 
the MSA when acquirer enters from outside of the 
biotech industry  
- Enforceability of post-employment non-compete 
covenants moderate these effects 
Vázquez, A. (2003). Growing network 
with local rules: Preferential attachment, 
clustering hierarchy, and degree 
correlations. Phys. Rev. E, 67:056104. 
- Linear preferential attachment 
hypothesis as explanation for the 
existence of networks with power-law 
degree distributions 
- Analytical and numerical results 
of different local rules 
- Effective linear preferential attachment is the 
natural outcome of growing network models based on 
local rules 
- Local models offer an explanation to other 
properties like the clustering hierarchy and degree 
correlations 
Ghoshal, G., Chi, L., and Barabási, A.-L. 
(2013). Uncovering the role of elementary 
processes in network evolution. Scientific 
Reports, 3(2920). 
- Identification of elementary mechanism 
and their role on network evolution 
- Focus on formation and deletion of 
connections 
 
- Formulating and solving a model 
with minimal processes of network 
evolution 
- Contribution to growth by formation of connections 
between existing pair of vertices, while others 
capture deletion 
- Dependence of the removal of a node with its 
corresponding edges, or the removal of an edge 
between a pair of vertices 
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Reference Content Methods Main findings 
Karrer, B. and Newman, M. E. J. (2011). 
Stochastic blockmodels and community 
structure in networks. Phys. Rev. E, 
83:016107. 
- Stochastic blockmodels as a tool for 
detecting community structure in 
networks 
- Variation in vertex degree and 
generalization of blockmodels 
- Generalized blockmodels 
- Heuristic algorithm for 
community detection using an 
objective function or its non-
degree-corrected counterpart 
- Improved objective function for community 
detection 
- Degree-corrected version outperforms the 
uncorrected one in the real-world and synthetic 
networks 
Hidalgo, C. A., Klinger, B., Barabási, A.-
L., and Hausmann, R. (2007). The 
product space conditions the development 
of nations. Science, 17(5837):482-487. 
- Characteristics and adaption of new 
products 
- Network of relatedness between 
products or “product space” and national 
technology and income level 
- Empirical methods - More-sophisticated products are located in a 
densely connected core 
- Less-sophisticated products occupy a less-
connected periphery 
Holme, P. (2005). Core-periphery 
organization of complex networks. Phys. 
Rev. E, 72:046111  
- Measurement of the core-periphery 
dichotomy for a number of real-world and 
model networks 
- Focus on statistical properties of the 
core and of the n neighbors of the core 
vertices for increasing n 
- A coefficient for the measurement 
of the core-periphery dichotomy is 
proposed 
- Geographically embedded transportation networks 
have a strong core-periphery structure 
- Almost all networks have many edges within n 
neighborhoods at a certain distance from the core 
Doreian, P. and Woodard, K. L. (1994). 
Defining and locating cores and 
boundaries of social networks. Social 
Networks 16:276-293. 
- General procedure for locating the 
boundary of a network and for discerning 
the boundaries within a network 
- First: Expanding (snowball) selection 
procedure 
- Second: specification of two critical 
parameters: the value of k for a k-core and 
the threshold, w, for the quantitative 
magnitude of network ties 
- Single sector and multi-sector 
social service inter-agency 
networks are used 
- Method for locating cores and boundaries generates 
a sequence of nested cores as k and w are 
systematically changed 
Borgatti, S. P. and Everett, M. G. (1999). 
Models of core/periphery structures. 
Social Networks 21:375-395. 
- Concept and formalization of a 
core/periphery structure 
- algorithm for the detection of a dense, 
cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected 
periphery 
- Statistical tests for testing a priori 
hypotheses 
- Different models are presented for different kinds of 
graphs (directed and indirected, valued and 
nonvalued) 
Silva, M. R. D., Ma, H., and Zeng, A. P. 
(2008). Centrality, network capacity, and 
modularity as parameters to analyze the 
core-periphery structure in metabolic 
networks. Proceedings of the IEEE, 
96(8), 1411-1420. 
- Deals with genome-scale metabolic 
networks of organism and their core-
periphery modular organization 
- Focus on hierarchical and modular 
structure of metabolic networks 
Development of method with 
genome-scale metabolic networks 
of five representative organisms, 
which include Aeropyrum pernix, 
Bacillus subtilis, Escherichia coli, 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae, and 
Homo sapiens 
- Proposes a parameter: the core coefficient which 
quantitatively evaluate the core-periphery structure of 
a metabolic network and which is based on the 
concepts of closeness centrality of metabolites and 
network capacity 
